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Becoming-lmperceptib Ie
as aMode of Self-Presentation:
AFeminist Model Drawn
from aDeleuzian Line of Flight
TAMSIN LORRAINE

For centuries, stereotypical notions of femininity have supported the confinement of women to a more restricted social role than that of men. Despite the fluctuations in such stereotypes in different times and places, the
result has been to define womanhood in a way that was painfully oppressive
to many of the women to whom these stereotypes were supposed to apply.
The question of how feminists can or should affirm their identities as women
as well as their political solidarity with other feminists and yet avoid subjecting one another to oppressive definitions of womanhood is yet to be resolved. Part of the dilemma relates to how we define ourselves as human
beings. One dominant norm of what it means to be human is that of a rational, autonomous individual with the clearly defined goals and desires of
someone with a coherent, unified sense of self that remains constant over
time. 1 Some feminists have argued for a political strategy premised upon
sexual difference rather than a fight for equality because they object to promoting women as candidates for attaining a human ideal of mainstream
culture that they believe to he inherently masculinist (as well as racist and
classist). 2 Thev claim that the masculinist ideal valorizes self-sufficiency
and independ:nce at the expense of the "feminine" traits of nurturing connection and open acknowledgment of interdependence. It is not surprising
that many feminists have turned away from theories about human nature
that define it in terms of a set of fixed attributes in favor of theoretical notions of human existence that characterize it as an ambiguous, open-ended
project of temporal becoming., Psychoanalysis has provided feminists interested in sexual difference with a particularly attractive version of a the_ory
that depicts human beings in terms of an undecidable project of becommg,
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due to its attempts to account for the formative period of early childhood
development as well as for the role of the sexed body in human existence.4
In this essay I address the dilemma of fighting for the acknowledgment
and acceptance of women as fully human as a problem of self-presentation:
how can we evade the reifying categories that stifle human creativity at the
same time that we don't disappear as subjects in our own right struggling
for social and political recognition? How do we present ourselves in all our
differences in terms that defy containment in fixed categories and yet pre•
vent the loss of visibility that thwarting categorization can entail? And how
can the new forms of self-presentation we develop affirm our connections
with one another and the world without effacing our specificity as individuals? In the first section of this paper, I present the critique of the Lacanian
version of Freudian subjectivity given by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
in Anti-Oedipus, and in the second, I explore the concepts of the "between,"
a deterritorializing line of flight, and becoming-imperceptible, created by
Deleuze, sometimes in collaboration with Guattari, in order to develop an
alternative model of subjectivity that might address this problem. It will be
my contention that the work of Deleuze, as well as of Deleuze and Guattari,
provide a fruitful resource for feminist conceptions of the self with exciting
implications. 5
A Lacanian model of subjectivity suggests that human subjects are a prob·
lematic intertwining of contingent and often conflicting social identities assumed at the level of imaginary identifications involving a morphology ofthe
body (that is, an ongoing materialization of the body in the specific forms
it takes), as well as at the level of conscious thought. This model captures
some of the ambiguity of an existence lived on neither side of a mind/body
dualism in interdependent relationship to others, and yet it still gives prior·
ity to the subject who would become self-sufficiently whole and master his
c?nnections to the world. Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on flows, energies, movements, and capacities, rather than a subject acting upon a world,
present a compelling alternative. Deleuze's work, along with his collabora·
tive wor~ with Guattari, develops a series of concepts that provide another
perspective upon ourselves and our relations to the world and others. Their
perspective emphasizes the myriad connections of self to world and the
transformative interactions that are an inevitable part of such connections.
Deleuze and Guattari are both wary of becoming entrapped in any one
conceptual framework and deliberately move from one model to the next.
An~ ?ne system of thought, on their view, rigidifies into a set of binary op·
P0st:mns tha~ close off possible connections, thereby disallowing the becommgs of Vital living. For Deleuze and Guattari, concepts are created_ to
~rovide_ new perspectives rather than to pronounce upon an already existmg reality_ And yet for the purposes of this paper I will develop one model
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along my own peculiar line of flight-a model that speaks to my own need
to challenge traditional boundaries between self and world and self and
others. It is my hope that this model will be read as an experiment designed
to initiate further experiments in self-presentation rather than as a description to be measured against the "truth" about human existence.
The model I explore here develops a vocabulary for presenting oneself in
a way that minimizes the gap between self and world instead of assuming
the self as the privileged anchor of a subject/object split. This self could be
compared to an area of geographical terrain encompassed by the larger environment that surrounds it with no necessity for maintaining clear-cut distinctions between what is self and what is not-self. A self, a conversation, a
book, on this model can be seen as a configuration of random and aleatory
elements converging to form one location with its own peculiar topology,
strata, and atmosphere. The contours of this self suggest a rich sense of connectedness, a kind of inevitable and mutually informing contact with surrounding terrain and the arbitrariness of any one way of staking out one's
boundaries. Such an image evokes a three-dimensional, multiply overdetermined sense of a self submerged in a world. A self that becomes part of a
terrain rather than acting upon it. The interconnections of such a self and
its world reach out in all directions and cannot be reduced to any one linear chain of cause and effect. Instead, it is a multiplicity among multiplicities, the various lines of which present distinct possibilities for movements
of becoming. This model problematizes dichotomies of active/passive and
agent/object and evokes an image of collaboration of self and world, a singular coming together of multiple lines in which the specific location and
shape of the self is impossible to pin down to any one point. It evokes an
open-ended and embodied involvement with the world that is never completely articulable and that is always moving in uncanny directions. Rather
than the insertion of a subject into a world that is other to it, this model
suggests that living is a collaborative encounter and that the most interesting encounters are those that occur beyond the reach of any kind of mastery. Such a model could be both personally empowering as well as politically effective as an alternative to the model for self-presentation assumed
in identity politics.
Mapping the terrain of such a self involves attentiveness to the intricate
convergence of multiple singularities that defy any imposition of a_ preconceived grid. The writer who would map such terrain must engage m a process of becoming-imperceptible; instead of locating herself vis-a-vis her
subject matter, she must follow the lines of flight that run through herself
and the multiplicities of which she is a part. This entails betraying any recognizable positioning and ignoring conventional boundaries in order_ to
follow the moving lines of this terrain. Developing a vocabulary for mappmg
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imperceptible becomings could enable an alternative approach to characterizing the singularities of local terrains without sacrificing the power of
self-presentation. Writing as a becoming-imperceptible is thus, on the reading I will give here, not about relinquishing the desire for visibility and
political empowerment, but is rather about an alternative model for achieving visibility.
Writing that is a becoming-imperceptible articulates a process of transformative encounters_ It attempts to, as it were, get behind the scenes of
self-presentation and map some part of the all-encompassing process of
temporal becoming out of which a recognizable self emerges. This mapping
refuses a deterministic account of the origins of self and instead lays out a
terrain of the self that opens out onto surrounding territory. It suggests new
ways of understanding the interconnections of self and world while retaining the specificity of the self's local terrain. Visibility, on this model, is
predicated not upon maintaining a gap between the self and the world, but
rather upon attentiveness to shifts in terrain. A becoming-imperceptible
that is mapped challenges traditional demarcations between self and other
without sacrificing the distinctive features of specific encounters. Mapping
refuses both reductionistic categories of self-presentation as well as the
failure of self-presentation. A self whose vitality emerges from behind-thescene encounters is a self immersed in a world of which it is an integral
part. It is a self that both affects and is affected by a vast range of hetero·
geneous multiplicities, a self who is formed and informing, a collaborative
result involved in further collaboration.
In the next section I present Deleuze and Guattari's challenge to the
psychoanalytic conception of desire and explore a model of subjectivity
premised upon productive desire rather than lack. Although the Lacanian
model problematizes the conception of self-sufficient autonomy as the
ideal norm for human selfhood, Deleuze and Guattari criticize this model
for interpreting all desire in terms of the limited constraints of the Oedipal
triangle. Assuming all desire to be Oedipal in nature turns out to entail
the presentation of a self whose contact with dynamic becoming is filtered
through gender-inflected structures. Their own model will turn out to be
less concerned with self-identity-gender-inflected or not-and more ,on·
cerned with productive connections of multiple kinds with a nonhuman as
well as human world-in-process.

The Lacking Subject and Productive Desire
~ccording to Lacan's account of (masculine) subjectivity, taking up a posi·
tion as a speaking subject requires clear-cut distinctions between oneself
as subject and one's objects. Human subjects emerge from corporeal en-
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tanglement with the mother and develop selves with definite corporeal and
conceptual boundaries. This occurs first when the infant layers up a "fictional" ego through a series of imaginary identifications with images that
assure pleasurable maternal contact. The subject further emerges out of
this state of confused boundaries by taking up a position as a speaking subject from which he can represent his desire for maternal contact with words.
Representations of the pleasurable maternal contact that would satisfy the
subject's desire undergoes transformation as the subject substitutes socially
appropriate objects of desire for the original one. The phallus as the master
signifier of desire authorizes concepts, representations, and formalizations
of language that prescribe an economy of subjectivity premised upon "castration." That is, the desire for connection and continuity with one's origins,
which is really a desire for connection and participation with life processes
extending beyond oneself, is reduced to the desire for an object one lacks.
To reconnect with one's origins is translated into possession of the maternal
body, and only those who have the phallus are entitled to such possession.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that to conceive of desire as a yearning to fill
in that lack that would make a subject whole is to diminish and overlook
the creative connections that desire is capable of producing. They insist
that the unconscious is not a theatre where a self is staged and performed
as the Oedipal drama of mommy/daddy/child, but a factory or production
machine. To construe it as the theatre of an Oedipal drama is to vastly impoverish the possibilities it produces for us. Instead of referring unconscious
desire to what is lacking in the subject in terms of the Oedipal triangle, they
posit an immanent notion of the unconscious, one that insists upon its productive nature." The fluid connections of unconscious processes produce
syntheses according to immanent flows of desire. The symbolic systems of
society provide a wide range of names that become attached to the various zones of intensity (or, in more Freudian terms, libidinal surges of desire) of an individual. These names only converge onto the limited cast of
characters of the Oedipal drama in societies with a specific form of social
production that could have been otherwise. The unconscious doesn't unravel into delirium (for example, in schizophrenia) through daddy/mommy,
but through races, tribes and continents, history, and geography-identifications drawn from the entire social field rather than merely from the familial drama. The model of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari present
in Anti-Oedipus insists upon viewing human beings as formed by and participating in processes of material production that are heterogeneous to the
7
perceptions and conceptions of an Oedipal subject.
•
• •
Schizoanalysis is a practice by which an individual, or grou~ 0 ~ md 1: 1duals, can rework their participation in social processes of sub1ect1fica_uon.
Like psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis reads aspects of conscious ex~enence
as symptoms of unconscious (or in more Deleuze-Guattarian terminology,
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molecular) processes and attempts to alleviate alienation from oneself, others, and life itself by symbolizing manifest indications of the unconscious
that allow for greater integration of these processes into conscious awareness. Unlike psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis draws upon a wide range of disparate vocabularies to symbolize presently imperceptible processes. It also
assumes that all life processes have molecular elements mostly imperceptible to us, whose configurations into larger aggregates are constantly
changing. Human existence is but a part of this larger process. Rather than
investigating the unconscious for secrets waiting to be revealed according
to an Oedipal frame of interpretation, schizoanalysis assumes that the unconscious is productive. Symbolization of unconscious processes according
to experiments in meaning created as desire unfolds, create new possibilities in living rather than reveal ones that have always been there. Insofar as
schizoanalysis engages a transformation of an individual or group that has
reverberating effects throughout the social field, it is a practice with revolutionary potential.
Like psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis does not take the conscious subject
we think of as fully human for granted. A sentient, language-speaking individual with self-conscious awareness is the effect of a complicated process. Deleuze and Guattari's descriptions of this process emphasizes the
continuity of human processes of production with other processes of production. On their view, all of life (which includes inanimate as well as animate objects) is a ceaseless flux of singularities that become organized into
various forms that could always have been otherwise. Because human life
is always implicated with "larger" productive processes, understanding human subjectivity requires theorizing human life in its ongoing implication
with all of life.
Psychoanalysis refers the submerged background out of which our
thoughts and actions emerge to the monotone account of an Oedipal drama.
But the unconscious in which Deleuze and Guattari are interested is not the
unconscious whose symptoms can be explained in reference to an alreadyestablished framework of interpretation. Deleuze and Guattari advocate
what they call "deterritorialization" from the norm by attending to points
of destabilization in existing patterns of organization. This process is analogous to schizoanalysis and entails attentiveness to the here and now in a
way that ~rings the "body" into play and challenges the traditional mind/
body dualisms of Western thought. Deleuze and Guattari would have you
use ~aution in your deterritorialization by mapping the process-pay at·
tentio~ t~ w~ere you are! Meticulously map your relation to the forms_ of
org~mzatwn m which you find yourself and see where you might free a line
?f flight. Foll?wing a line of flight entails pursuing the connections created
m the unfolding of a desire interested only in the intensity of its own flow.

Becoming-Imperceptible as a Mode of Self-Presentation

185

Making a map entails experimenting with the connections one can make.
"The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious." 8 It fosters connections among different areas of
life and the removal of blockages both within as well as among individuals
in dynamic interaction with a world.
Deleuze and Guattari's refusal to remain with a psychoanalytic account
of desire prompts them to explore an exciting range of possibilities in deterritorialization. Psychoanalysis can lead one to believe that the only route
to destructuring overly constrictive forms of subjectivity in order to stimulate richer integrations of libidinal drive is through pursuing the secret of
0edipalized desire. According to Deleuze and Guattari's critique, psychoanalytic theory preserves the bounded self of the cultural norm by filtering connections to the world through the Oedipal schema. Although one
could argue that psychoanalysis revives connection with the world by
challenging the notion that the self has nonproblematic boundaries, it still
tightly controls any ruptures in those boundaries. That is, according to the
Lacanian model, although I might not be the unified, coherent self I want
to present myself as, I have no choice but to attempt to obtain the objects
of desire that I believe-if only unconsciously-would make me the self I
pretend and want so much to be.
Deleuze experiments with forms of self-presentation that insist neither
upon staving off a world from which the self must remain distinct, nor
on comparing the self to a totalized identity it can never achieve. Although
Lacanian psychoanalysis chooses to view the lack of the subject with respect to a totalized ideal as the inevitable tragedy of the human condition,
Deleuze chooses to present himself as never lacking. Instead of remaining
focused on a personal self maintaining itself in a world that always threatens to overwhelm it, Deleuze focuses on the multiple productive connections each individual has with her or his surroundings. This renders the
conception of a self-identical self highly problematic; productive desire inevitably entails dynamic interaction with a world in continual transformation. This self, rather than having a perspective upon and apart from the
world of temporal becoming, is part of a process of dynamic differentiation.
It is the contention of this paper that Deleuze begins to provide a new model
of subjectivity that would enable a form of self-presentation premised upon
such dynamic interaction.
Returning to the metaphor of self as geographical terrain, it becomes apparent that dynamic contact with one's surroundings and shifting_ boun?aries do not necessarily entail annihilation of the self. Subject/obJect distinctions are problematized; with uncertain boundaries (between one part
of the land and another, between earth and sky, between the creatures living in one area and those of another), no one term of any dichotomy can
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be privileged as the originating agent, and no one dichotomy can be abstracted from the process in which its terms are immersed. And yet Deleuze
provides a vocabulary for mapping the contours of the self's terrain. It is
not shifting boundaries that threaten this self, but the failure to map its
transformations. To extend the metaphor, we might compare the self to a
line of movement in an ecosystem. By focusing on lines of movement rather
than abstracting originating points for that movement out of the processes
of which they are a part, Deleuze creates concepts that allow us to map,
and thereby render perceptible, a self that is always in flux.
It turns out to be part of Deleuze's self-presentation that he is and thinks
and writes only in collaboration and never as what we might call an autonomous individual. He contests any assumption of unified identity and
chooses instead to emphasize the becomings of which subjects are only the
effects. In the next section, I will further explore the process of rendering dynamic becoming perceptible in the context of a model of self-presentation
by examining Deleuze's notion of writing-or mapping-as a form of
becoming-imperceptible.

Becoming-Imperceptible and Self-Presentation
In Dialogues Deleuze characterizes both Dialogues itself, his work, his work
process, and his collaborative effort with Guattari. 9 Dialogues was meant
to be an interview. Instead, it became a collaboration between Deleuze and
Claire Parnet in which neither's contribution was clearly marked. In the
English preface to Dialogues, Deleuze says about the book that emerged that
(W)hat mattered was not the points-Felix, Claire Parnet, me and many
others, who functioned simply as temporary, transitory and evanescent
points of subjectivation-but the collection of bifurcating, divergent and
muddled lines which constituted this book as a multiplicity and which
passed between the points, carrying them along without ever going from
the one to the other. Hence, the first plan for a conversation between two
people, in which one asked questions and the other replied, no longer had
a_ny_ v_alue. The divisions had to rest on the growing dimensions of the multiphcity, according to becomings which were unattributable to individuals, since they could not be immersed in it without changing qualitatively.
(Dialogues, ix-xzz)
This description of the making of the book captures aspects of the writing
process that are typically ignored. First, Deleuze chooses to emphasize the
between of a collaborative process rather than label the origin and ownership of the ideas making up the content of the book. Second, Deleuze em·
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phasizes the aleatory nature of this coming together of a collection of lines
rather than the mastery manifested by any individual vis-a-vis these lines.
In Dialogues, Deleuze calls himself an empiricist and says that empiricism is linked to a logic of multiplicities. Every "thing" is a multiplicity and
is made up of a set of lines (Dialogues, vii). One extracts concepts corresponding to multiplicities by mapping the lines that make up a multiplicity. These lines are "true becomings." Becomings are not unities. They are
not subjects of a history. They cannot be captured through a process of
representation that would trace an event's origin from out of a historical
context; instead, they happen behind one's back. Deleuze suggests that it
is in such becomings that the real stuff of life occurs-the happenings
that lead to encounters with others, novelty, creativity, and the singularity
of existence when it just is rather than when it conforms to a preconceived
schema.
Movement always happens behind the thinker's back, or in the moment
when he blinks .... We think too much in terms of history, whether personal or universal. Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations,
directions, entries. (Dialogues, 1-2).
Mapping contextualizes by providing the texture of the lay of the land;
instead of tracing out a historical sequence, it provides a cartography that
can be pursued in any number of ways. To say that Dialogues is a multiplicity is to say that the book emerged neither from Deleuze as author or
interviewee, nor from Claire Parnet as interviewer, nor from Guattari or
the various thinkers affecting Deleuze and Guattari's work. We could talk
about Deleuze and Parnet as subjects of distinct histories and give an account of how they came together in the writing of this book. But this would
miss what for Deleuze is the crucial point: the book grew along lines that
cannot be reduced to such a history. The becomings that make up the book
are unattributable to individuals and cannot be accounted for by giving a
history of its various factors construed as coherent unities with past and future effects. This does not, however, render the lines of the book any less
real. Books, as well as selves and other "things," can be thought of as unities with histories, or they can be thought of as multiplicities with lines of
becoming that connect with the lines of other multiplicities in unpredictable ways. To think and write in terms of recognizable unities is to close off
movement along lines of flight; it is to conform to a code of_do~inant ~tterances (Dialogues, 74). Instead of responding to subtle shifts 1~ terrain,
such thinking conforms to an already established conceptual gnd an~ so
cannot introduce genuine novelty. Texts composed in order to cohe~e mto
a closed system don't foster multiple connections with the world; Imes of
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flight adhere to no already established structure and instead give priority
to following out the intensities of new connections. To think and write in
terms of becoming is "to release from becoming that that will not permit
itself to be fixed in a term" (Dialogues, 75). This kind of thinking challenges any preconceptions by bringing one up against that which forces a
kind of thinking which is also a creating. 10
Deleuze thinks that traditional philosophy impedes and even prevents
thinking. Emphasizing the centers of totalization and points of subjectivation of multiplicities, be they books, people, or thoughts, prevents the
"transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes from the resentment
of persons, societies and reigns" (Dialogues, 50). He deliberately contrasts
his own approach to that of traditional philosophy (which he claims to be
"shot through with the project of becoming the official language of a pure
State" [Dialogues, 13]). For Deleuze, the aim of writing is to follow out,
rather than stop, the lines that make up multiplicities, even if this means
running the risk of becoming unintelligible or unrecognizable.
Still way beyond a woman-becoming, a Negro-becoming, an animalbecoming, etc., beyond a minority-becoming, there is the final enterprise
of the becoming-imperceptible. Oh no, a writer cannot wish to he "known,"
recognized .... Writing has no other end than to lose one's face, to jump
over or pierce through the wall, to plane down the wall very patiently.
(Dialogues, 45)

Perception involves resemblance and similarity. To be visible, a becoming must already be perceivable, and to be perceivable means that it will be
perceived as being like something else. Becomings are imperceptible. In the
third chapter of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze claims philosophy's image of thought is based on a model of recognition. This model assumes a
coherence of both subject and object and a correspondence between the two.
Subject and object are both taken to be unities, and these unities are determined through resemblance and analogy. Deleuze argues that the philosophical doctrine of faculties assumes this model of recognition and in so
doing assumes the unity of a thinking subject and thus the convergence of
various faculties upon a coherent object. Plato's theory of the forms created
a representational image of thought that subordinated difference to identity and resemblance; the "truth" of thinking was measured against the
original ideals of the forms. 11 Kant continued in this tradition when he
posited the "I think" as the most general principle of representation; it is
when each faculty "locates its given as identical to that of another" that the
faculties are related in the "I think" of the subjective unity of a consciousness with a recognizable object as its correlate. 12
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Recognition, for Kant, entails relating our faculties through a harmonious
accord brought about in the convergence of the faculties upon an object
that each faculty takes as identical to the object of the other faculties.
"[I]t is the same object that can be seen, remembered, imagined, conceived,
and so on." Common sense is "the supposed identity of the subject that
functions as the foundation of our faculties, as the principle that unites
them in this harmonious accord" (Sensation, 30). For Deleuze, conceiving
of thought in terms of recognition curtails its creative force. Harmonious
accord of the faculties can only be achieved in terms of agreement on the
identity of their respective objects. To assume that it is only such objects
that are real is to subordinate difference to identity. What is thinkable or
perceivable is what is recognizable; what is recognizable is that which can
be referred to what is the same.
Following lines of becomings might indicate a different story. Something in
the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition
but of a fundamental encounter. ... It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary
characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. ( What Is? 139).
Insofar as an object is unrecognizable, it is imperceptible. The object of an
encounter cannot be recognized, Deleuze argues, because one's sensibility
can recognize only that which can be apprehended by the other faculties as
well, in the context of a coherent object upon which the faculties converge
(What Is? 140). The assumption that the various faculties of a self will converge in recognizing an object suggests that "the form of identity in objects
relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject, of which all the
other faculties must be modalities" ( What Is? 133 ). In a discussion of Platonic reminiscence, Deleuze states that sensibility in the presence of the imperceptible "finds itself before its own limit ... and raises itself to the level
of a transcendental exercise" (What Is? 140). Thinking that is forced to
grasp "that which can only be thought" unhinges the faculties and breaks
with common sense ( What Is? 141 ).
Rather than all the faculties converging and .:ontributing to a common
project of recognising an object, we see divergent projects in which, wi th
· Ill
· t he presen ce of that
regard to what concerns it essentially, each facu 1ty 1s
which is its "own." Discord of the faculties, chain of force and fuse along
which each confronts its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) th e
other only a violence which brings it face to face with its own element, as
though with its disappearance or its perfection. (What Is? 141 )
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Kant's project delineates multiple forms that common sense can take.
The faculty of understanding dominates logical common sense, reason
dominates moral common sense, whereas "various faculties enter into an
accord which is no longer determined by any one of them" in the case
of aesthetic common sense. Ll That there can be more than one form of
common sense suggests that there can be more than one way that one's faculties converge upon an object. This suggests that the form of thought is
not as uniform as the model of recognition might indicate. Furthermore,
Deleuze argues that Kant's notion of the sublime provides an example of
faculties in a discordant harmony in which "there is ... something which
is communicated from one faculty to another" without forming a common
sense. 14 Against an image of thought that posits it as a passive process of
representation,
Deleuze defends a conception of thought as something to which we are
provoked precisely by those phenomena we do not recognize, or by forces
from outside our habitual range of experience. Only by abandoning the
banal model of recognition in favor of something closer to the Kantian
sublime is it possible to conceive of thought as an essentially creative activity: thought as the creation of concepts, where concepts themselves are
understood as existing only in immediate relations with forces and intensities outside thought. ("Anti-Platonism," 145)
What Deleuze calls a "superior," "transcendental" empiricism would explore that which cannot be grasped from the point of view of common
sense by exploring the point at which each faculty is brought to:
the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to triple violence:
the violence of that which forces it to be exercised of that which it is forced
to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet al:o that of the ungraspable
(from the point of view of its empirical exercise). (Difference, 143)
Objects apprehended according to the dictates of common sense may evoke
nothing new-no creative thinking, for example. But life always eludes
c_ommon sense. It is the violence of an aleatory encounter that brings a particular faculty to its own specific limit, thus rendering the communication
among faculties necessary for achieving a harmonious convergence upon
an object either difficult or impossible. Without such a convergence, no
e'.11pirical object can emerge, and yet, Deleuze suggests, it is precisely such
v10lent encounters that make up the terrain of actual living.
A Deleuzian doctrine of the faculties would require determining what
element carries the faculties to their respective limits.
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This element is intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, as that
which is at once both imperceptible for empirical sensibility which grasps
intensity only already covered or mediated by the quality to which it gives
rise, and at the same time that which can be perceived only from the point
of view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately in
the encounter. (Difference, 144)
Here Deleuze approaches talking about the unsayable-that part of experience which cannot be talked about because it is singular, the part of experience-no matter how ordinary or mundane that experience may bethat eludes any description we may try to give it. For Deleuze, thought has
to deal with this difference rather than proffer the model of recognition as
an image of thought because it is only due to "an original violence inflicted
upon thought" that thought is awakened:
[T]here is only involuntary thought, aroused but constrained within
thought, and all the more absolutely necessary for being born, illegitimately, of fortuitousness in the world. (Difference, 139)
For Deleuze, it would seem that we are brought to a thinking that goes
beyond a dogmatic image of thought by something imperceptible about our
experience-something that we encounter, that we experience, that we immediately apprehend, and yet do not perceive. Such encounters, if pursued,
challenge the unity of the self and the unity of an object presented to a self.
Focusing on the element of difference involves both an intensity of experience as well as violence and the dissolution of one's faculties. One is precisely not a unified self attending to a unified object when one grasps this
intensive element. This element is instead that which brings each faculty to
its limit. Transcendental empiricism would explore the limits of each faculty in pursuit of the behind-the-scene encounters that provoke vital living
and thinking.
To write in a way that follows out this kind of thinking is to refuse a dogmatic image of thought-that is, to refuse an image of thought based on a
model of recognition where everything is referred to a self. But what would
an imageless thinking be? To write, for Deleuze, should be a becomingimperceptible where you allow lines of flight to release you both from the
central reference of a self as well as the organizing focus of coherent objects. Instead one allows a kind of violence to occur that follows intensities and flow; without worrying where they come from or what their histories might be.
To write has no other function: to be a flux which combines with 0th er
fluxes-all the minority-becomings of the world. A flux is something in-
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tensive, instantaneous and mutant-between a creation and a destruction.
It is only when a flux is deterritorialized that it succeeds in making its conjunction with other fluxes, which deterritorialize it in their turn, and vice
versa. (Dialogues, 50)
Following out the lines of flight of a multiplicity involves delirium and betrayal. On such lines of flight one no longer has a past or future; one betrays
the fixed and established powers of the earth that try to hold one back, and
one turns one's face away from God who turns his face away from humanity. "It is in this double turning-away, in the divergence of faces, that
the line offlight-that is, the deterritorialization of man-is traced." Thus,
one "goes off the rails," betrays one's commonsense notions of oneself, one's
place in society or history, one's relationship to people and things, and becomes demonic (Dialogues, 40). A writer jumps across intervals and "makes
one multiplicity pass into another." She refuses traditional boundaries and
her utterance "is the product of an assemblage-which is always collective,
which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities,
territories, becomings, affects, events." Her proper name "does not designate a subject, but something that happens, at least between two terms that
are not subjects, but agents, elements" (Dialogues, 51 ). She is, in an important sense, impersonal. Although the lines that make her up form a singular multiplicity, none of these lines have a history. And each line presents
the possibility of a line of flight that both escapes the limits of any commonsense understanding of personal boundedness and transmutates into
other multiplicities.
As writers that are becoming-imperceptible, we are not unified subjects
with histories, but nomads following lines of flight, traitors to established
practices with neither past nor future. We map geographies of intensities
in a desert bereft of traditional landmarks and yet full of becomings and
encounters with the imperceptible. We are no one self with an interior and
exterior but are ourselves inventions of assemblages that in turn invent
(Dialogues, 51 ).
Deleuze's conception of the self and of writing suggests that living and
writing are inevitably collaborative processes that are reduced to the acts
of_individuals only by discounting living lines of flight among multiplicities.
His overtly collaborative work with Guattari is therefore a natural extension of his project. His way of presenting the collaborative process between
them suggests the obvious parallels to be made between one self as a multiplicity and the multiplicity formed through the collaboration of two selves.
We were only two, but what was important for us was less our working together than this strange fact of working between the two of us. We stopped
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being "author." And these "between-the-twos" referred back to other
people, who were different on one side from on the other. The desert
expanded, but in so doing became more populous. This had nothing to
do with a school, with processes of recognition, but much to do with encounters. And all these stories of becomings, of nuptials against nature, of
a parallel evolution, of bilingualism, of theft of thoughts, were what I had
with Felix. (Dialogues, 17).
Deleuze neither denies nor denigrates his part in this process of collaboration, and yet the place that he finds for himself in it is not predicated upon
having to claim or own any particular part of the work. He may present
himself as becoming-imperceptible in his writing, but his writing maps this
process by attending to the terrain of its occurrence. The encounters of this
becoming-imperceptible are part of this terrain. The writing produced from
this mapping results in a collaborative effort in which two selves become
one multiplicity with neither self losing its specificity in the process.
Intensities, flows, affects that we cannot name, are all part of our experience-an elusive part that we may attempt to express or ignore as trivial.
Vocabulary for the emotions and for kinesthetic experience is crude and
inadequate. And yet many of us feel that what we can talk about in words
is often inadequate to our reality. A writer-or at least the kind of writer
Deleuze is interested in-is a becoming-imperceptible and becomingimperceptible arises through encounter. It is through a thinking that doesn't
refer itself to an image and a writing that is a line of flight that the becomings of encounters can manifest. The characterization Deleuze gives of the
book Dialogues works as well for thinking and the "between" of ideas,
writing and the "between" of becoming-imperceptible, and living and the
"between" of conversations with people. In all three forms of life, Deleuze
creates a vocabulary that minimizes the role of anything that one might call
a starting or ending point in order to focus on the moment of contact or interaction between and among ideas, events, and people. In the process, he
puts commonsense notions about ideas, events, and people into question.
Self-presentation, according to such a model, could indicate the multiple
connections of women with the world without confining them to any one
image of womanhood. On a terrain marked by gender warfare, I will have
some relationship to the cultural stereotypes imposed upon me. Th_is relationship will shift given the terrain of my specific situation._ Mappmg th e
contours of my terrain allows me to present myself to others m terms of th e
connections I have created and want to create. Because I present myself m
terms of my engagements with the world, rather than in terms of an _identity I maintain as the self-same, my boundaries can shift_without the nsk of
self-annihilation. As long as the category of "woman" is a part of th e ter-
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rain, it will be part of my self-mapping; alliances can shift without changing that this category is still a feature of the terrain I share with others.
Focusing on the moment and the place where something happens shocks
our sensibilities and suggests new lines of flight. This suggests alternative understandings of events and things. A self as a desert populated with flora and
fauna. A writing that is not an enunciation, but a becoming-imperceptible.
A conversation that is not about the people involved, but about the zigzag
of ideas that takes place. Emphasizing contact and contiguity, lines among
heterogeneous elements, suggests that the stuff of life, whatever is, can be
understood in ways other than that of subject, object, and predicate. Instead
of subordinating a description to a focal point anchored in a substratumthat which remains the same despite any changes-Deleuze attempts descriptions that focus on the moment of contact and so shift and mutate to
follow points of living movement into a line of flight. This necessitates a
conceptual shift in our thinking. It requires a kind of movement that can be
both liberating and disorienting. It involves a process of deterritorialization
that can bring us both exhilarating highs as well as terrifying risks.
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